So that we may become good - Nicomachean Ethics, Book II

Thoughts

Highlights

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Intellectual and moral virtues 🔗

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there are two different sorts of virtues: intellectual and moral. The intellectual virtues are wisdom and prudence. 🔗

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The moral virtues are things like justice, courage, and moderation. 🔗

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Intellectual virtues are taught, requiring time and experience. (So they are not merely acquired by being told once or twice about them.) Moral virtues are habituated. Indeed, the word for moral virtue in Greek, ēthikē, is a slight alteration of ethos, the word for habit. 🔗

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The virtues are not present in us by nature; we are not born virtuous. Rather, we are born with the capacity for virtue. These capacities need to be developed. 🔗

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one becomes virtuous by acting virtuously. But crudely, moral virtue really is ‘fake it until you make it’ sort of thing. 🔗

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The role of pleasure (and a bit about the arts) 🔗

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By acting virtuously again and again, you develop the habit of being virtuous. You also start to think virtuously, making the right sort of judgments. And importantly, you begin to take pleasure in acting virtuously. 🔗

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virtues typically require a kind of development, and thus acting virtuously is a kind of skill. 🔗

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it is possible to create a beautiful artistic work by chance. And that is importantly different from virtuous action. We cannot be virtuous by chance, because a truly virtuous action requires that the action be in a certain state (it being the virtuous thing to do) but also that the actor be in a certain state (thinking and judging virtuously). Virtue ethics, in general, requires that someone does the right thing for the right reason. 🔗

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Utilitarians really only care about the right action. Kantians think you need to do it for the right reason, too. Virtue ethics, in this regard, is more similar to Kantianism than to utilitarianism. 🔗

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So while you can perform moderate actions when you are not yourself moderate, what is really happening in this case is that you are becoming virtuous — you just aren’t there yet. 🔗

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But whatever deeds arise in accord with the virtues are not done justly or moderately if they are merely in a certain state, but only if he who does those deeds is in a certain state as well: first, if he acts knowingly; second, if he acts by choosing and by choosing the actions in question for their own sake; and, third, if he acts while being in a steady and unwavering state 🔗

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Virtue is the mean between vices 🔗

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Virtue, therefore, is a characteristic marked by choice, residing in the mean relative to us, a characteristic defined by reason and as the prudent person would define it. Virtue is also a mean with respect to two vices, the one vice related to excess, the other to deficiency; and further, it is a mean because some vices fall short of and others exceed what should be the case in both passions and actions, whereas virtue discovers and chooses the middle term. Thus, with respect to its being and the definition that states what it is, virtue is a mean; but with respect to what is best and the doing of something well, it is an extreme. 🔗

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First, virtuous action is a choice — it can’t be pure reflex or done through coercion. This is because it is a product of our rational soul. 🔗

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Second, virtue resides in a mean ‘relative to us.’ The relative clause is important here, as we are not concerned with virtue for any sort of creature, but rather for us in particular. 🔗

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Third, a virtue is a mean between two vices. Vices are excesses of action, and virtue sits somewhere between two vices. Consider courage. Courage sits between cowardice and recklessness. Cowardice and recklessness are vices, and courage is the virtue. But this does not mean courage is exactly in the middle. We are looking for the golden mean, the natural balancing point between the two vices. In the case of some virtues, one vice is much closer to the virtue than the other (like moderation is closer to insensibility than to gluttony). 🔗

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Fourth, virtue is an extreme. You cannot be too courageous. If you are in excess, you cease to be courageous and become, say, reckless. But this isn’t because you are too courageous, but rather have deviated from courage into recklessness. This is an important point, because it allows us to say that being virtuous is always good; there is no such thing as too much of a good thing, at least when we speak of virtue. 🔗