Anti-Oedipus 1.4: A Materialist Psychiatry

Highlights

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Clerambault and the Problem of Delirium as Secondary

The famous hypothesis put forward by the psychiatrist G. de Clerambault seemswell founded: delirium, which is by nature global and systematic, is a secondary phenomenon, a consequence of partial and local automatistic phenomena. (AO, 22) Page 3

They reference French psychiatrist Gatian de Clérambault who considers delirium to be a secondary phenomenon. As noted in Chapter 1.3, for Schreber to declare that he is becoming a woman, he must first internalizethe delirium. This process depends on on the delirious nature of what defines a woman. Whatever constitutes the concept of a woman — whatever‘woman’ even means — must exist prior to the delirium in the form of affections upon Schreber’s body without organs Page 3

delirium is essentially imagination itself. In otherwords, delirium is a secondary phenomenon that does not strictly adhere toa linear path of recording; instead, delirium diverges from the path of recording. If this divergence becomes significant enough to create abifurcation, it is referred to as schizophrenia Page 4

Delirium is in fact characteristic of the recording that is made of the process of production of the desiring-machines; and though there are syntheses and disorders (af ections) that are peculiar to this recording process, as we see in paranoia andeven in the paranoid forms of schizophrenia, it does not constitute an autonomous sphere, for it depends on the functioning and the breakdowns of desiring-machines. (AO, 22) Page 5

In Anti-Oedipus,schizophrenia is understood in two distinct ways. First, there isschizophrenia as a clinical condition, which is highlighted in the sixthparagraph of this section. In this case, schizophrenia is interrupted or put into the context of an end goal; these are the people found in mental institutions. Second, there is schizophrenia as a process of decoding and deterritorializing flows of desire, which is highlighted in the final few paragraphs of this section. In the first case — the case of the clinical entity schizophrenia as a process of decoding and deterritorialization becomesinterrupted or turned into an end goal where schizophrenia is divorcedfrom its processual nature. In the second case, schizophrenia serves as a process in a state of becoming. Regardless, delirium is especially important in the context of all cases of schizophrenia because it represents a departure from an established path of recording. The difference betweenschizophrenia as a clinical condition and schizophrenia as a process ofdecoding and deterritorialization lies in the degree to which this delirium manifests. Page 5

nothing is independent of the production process Page 5

For example, Deleuze and Guattarireference paranoid forms of schizophrenia, such as a paranoid schizophrenicbelieving that someone intends to harm them, even if no such threat exists.However, it’s important to emphasize that these beliefs, thoughts, oraffections do not exist in isolation; they are not part of an autonomoussphere. Paranoid schizophrenia and the deliriums associated with it aresecondary to the recording process itself. It is contingent upon thefunctioning and breakdown of desiring-machines, meaning that all thesephenomena are interconnected and dependent upon the process of production. Page 6

Nonetheless Clerambault used the term “(mental) automatism” to designate onlyathematic phenomena — echolalia, the uttering of odd sounds, or sudden irrational outbursts — which he attributed to the mechanical ef ects of infections or intoxications. (AO, 22) Page 7

Moreover, [Clerambault] explained a large part of delirium in turn as an ef ect ofautomatism; as for the rest of it, the “personal” part, in his view it was of thenature of a reaction and had to do with “character,” the manifestations of which might well precede the automatism (as in the paranoiac character, for instance). (AO, 22) Page 7

Clerambault finds these behaviors to be isolated incidents rather than a secondary result of the functioning andbreakdown of desiring-machines. Page 7

Clerambault identifies two keyaspects of delirium. First, he views delirium as resulting from automatism,suggesting that certain responses or behaviors are automatic and caused byphysical conditions like infections or intoxications. Second, he posits that the remaining aspects of delirium are linked to an individual’s character, whymay influence of precede these automatic responses Page 7

Clerambault regarded automatism as merely a neurological mechanism inthe most general sense of the word, rather than a process of economic productioninvolving desiring-machines. (AO, 22; emphasis mine) Page 8

As for history, [Clerambault] was content merely to mention its innate or acquirednature. (AO, 22) Page 9

Clerambault’s brief mention of history is insufficient for Dleuze and Guattari.Clerambault considers history to be either innate (inherent from birth),acquired (shaped by one’s character), or a combination of both. However,Deleuze and Guattari critique this view for being overly reductive.Clerambault emphasizes automatism and treats experiences as isolated rather than part and parcel with the sociohistorical field. Page 9

• [N] Deleuze and Guattari find Clerambault's hypothesis about delirium as secondary and arising from partial automatisms interesting, but critique his understanding of automatism and history as isolated neurological or individual traits, rather than connected to the sociohistorical and desiring-production field.

This section introduces G. de Clérambault's concept of delirium as a secondary phenomenon stemming from automatistic occurrences. Deleuze and Guattari agree that delirium is secondary to the process of production, but critique Clérambault for attributing automatism solely to isolated neurological or character-based factors, failing to see their connection to sociohistorical processes and desiring-machines. They emphasize that delirium is tied to the functioning and breakdown of desiring-machines and that schizophrenia, understood both clinically and as a process of decoding/deterritorialization, involves a departure from established recording paths.

#on/clerambault #on/delirium

The Task of a Materialist Psychiatry

A truly materialist psychiatry can be defined, on the contrary, by the twofold taskit sets itself: introducing desire into the mechanism, and introducing production into desire. (AO, 22) Page 10

• [N] A materialist psychiatry must integrate desire into the mechanics of production and production into desire, treating them as interconnected forces.

A materialist psychiatry is defined by the twofold task of introducing desire into the mechanisms of the unconscious and introducing production into the understanding of desire. This contrasts with approaches that isolate these elements.

#on/materialistpsychiatry #on/desire

Critique of Traditional Schizophrenia Theories: Kraepelin, Bleuler, and Binswanger

There is no very great dif erence between false materialism and typical forms ofidealism. (AO, 22; emphasis mine) Page 11

The theory of schizophrenia is formulated in terms of three concepts that constituteits trinary schema: dissociation (Kraepelin), autism (Bleuler), and space-time or being-in-the-world (Binswanger). (AO, 22) Page 11

Dissociation (Kraepelin Page 11

[Kraepelin’s concept] is an explanatory concept that supposedly locates the specific dysfunction or primary deficiency. (AO, 22) Page 13

Kraepelin introduced the concept of dissociation to explain dementia praecox, proposing that the disorder was rooted in a specific dysfunction or deficiency, which he largely understood to be a biological impairment. Page 13

Autism (Bleuler Page 13

[Bleuler’s concept] is an ideational concept indicating the specific nature of theef ect of the disorder: the delirium itself or the complete withdrawal from the outside world, “the detachment from reality, accompanied by a relative or an absolute predominance of [the schizophrenic’s] inner life.” (AO, 22–23) Page 15

and recognizing a Bleuler offered a broaderperspective, acknowledging degrees of impairment wider range of behaviors. He introduced the concept of “autism” as a symptom ofschizophrenia, which, in his usage, referred to a literal, etymological senseof the word: autism as being closed off or detached from reality. Page 15

Space-time or being-in-the-world (Binswanger Page 15

Swiss psychiatrist, Ludwig Binswanger, was concerned with how individualswith schizophrenia interacted with and perceived their environment. Page 16

[Binswanger’s] concept is a descriptive one, discovering or rediscovering the delirious person in his own specific world. (AO, 23) Page 17

What is common to these three concepts is the fact that they all relate the problem of schizophrenia to the ego through the intermediary of the “body image” — the final avatar of the soul, a vague conjoining of the requirements of spiritualismand positivism. (AO, 23) Page 17

Though Kraepelin, Bleuler, and Binswanger differ in how they conceptualize schizophrenia, they all have one thing in common: the ego. Page 17

These theorists fall short by conceptualizing schizophrenia solely as an individual pathology. Deleuze and Guattari’s critique focuses on theassumption that a coherent self exists beneath schizophrenia and that this self can be discovered by overcoming the disorder. They argue thatschizophrenia should be understood in the context of sociohistorical conditions, rather than through an idealized concept of the body and its expected functions Page 17

The ego, however, is like daddy-mommy: the schizo has long since ceased to believein it. [The schizo] is somewhere else, beyond or behind or below these problems, rather than immersed in them. (AO, 23 Page 18

• [N] Kraepelin, Bleuler, and Binswanger offer different concepts for schizophrenia (dissociation, autism, being-in-the-world) but share a focus on the ego and the idea of an underlying coherent self.
• [N] Deleuze and Guattari critique this focus on the ego, arguing that schizophrenia should be understood in relation to sociohistorical conditions rather than as an individual pathology or deviation from an idealized body concept.

This section critiques traditional psychiatric approaches to schizophrenia by Kraepelin, Bleuler, and Binswanger. While their concepts (dissociation, autism, space-time) offer different perspectives, they are unified by a focus on the ego and the assumption of an underlying self, which Deleuze and Guattari reject. They argue that schizophrenia transcends the ego and should be understood in the context of sociohistorical processes rather than idealized individual pathology.

#on/schizophrenia #on/ego #on/psychiatry

Schizophrenia Beyond the Oedipal Framework

And wherever [the schizo] is, there are problems, insurmountable suf erings,unbearable needs. But why try to bring [the schizo] back to what [the schizo] has escaped from, why set [the schizo] back down amid problems that are no longer problems to [the schizo], why mock his truth by believing that we have paid it its due by merely figuratively taking our hats of to it? (AO, 23) Page 19

Why insist on making the schizo confront the issues of mommy and daddy when they have already escaped the issues ofmommy and daddy? Page 19

There are those who will maintain that the schizo is incapable of uttering the wordI, and that we must restore his ability to pronounce this hallowed word. All of which the schizo sums up by saying: they’re fucking me over again. (AO, 23) Page 20

“I won’t say I any more, I’ll never utter the word again; it’s just too damn stupid.Every time I hear it, I’ll use the third person instead, if I happen to remember to. If it amuses them. And it won’t make one bit of dif erence.” (AO, 23) Page 20

And if [the schizo] does chance to utter the word I again, that won’t make anydif erence either. [The schizo] is too far removed from these problems, too far pastthem. (AO, 23 Page 20

Regarding the schizo being marginalized (or rather, the schizo being ‘fucked over’), Deleuze and Guattari refer to Irish novelist Samuel Beckett’s 1953 novel, The Unnamable Page 20

Thus, although the the schizo says “I” , this “I” is fundamentally divorced from the Cartesian “I”: Page 20

And what prevented him from doing so was his own tripartite formula — theOedipal, neurotic one: daddy-mommy-me. (AO, 23 Page 21

• [N] Deleuze and Guattari question the therapeutic goal of forcing schizophrenics back into ego-centric or Oedipal frameworks that they have already moved beyond.
• [N] The schizophrenic's use of "I" is detached from the conventional, Cartesian subject, indicating a state of being beyond the Oedipal triangulation.
• [N] Traditional psychoanalysis, particularly the Oedipus complex, limits understanding by trapping individuals within the "daddy-mommy-me" structure.

This section argues against forcing the schizophrenic into conventional frameworks centered on the ego or the Oedipus complex. They suggest that the schizophrenic has moved beyond these concerns, and attempts to restore a conventional sense of "I" or engage them in Oedipal issues are misguided. They invoke Samuel Beckett's "The Unnamable" to illustrate the schizophrenic's detached use of language and criticize psychoanalysis for being trapped by the Oedipal structure it propagates.

#on/oedipuscomplex #on/schizophrenia #on/ego

Freud's Dislike of Schizophrenics and the Limit of Psychoanalysis

Anti-Oedipus seeks to deconstruct SigmundFreud’s Oedipus complex which reduces the ego to these limitedperspectives. Page 21

It’s not that Freud lacked the ability to go beyond this limited conception ofthe ego; rather, his own propagation of the Oedipus complex restricted himfrom from moving beyond this limited conception of the ego: Page 21

For we must not delude ourselves: Freud doesn’t like schizophrenics. He doesn’t like their resistance to being oedipalized, and tends to treat them more or less as animals. (AO, 23; emphasis mine) Page 22

Freud wasunable to envision desire outside of this structure. Page 22

Freud’s harsh treatment of schizophrenics stems from his belief in a normative subject capable of achieving transference. Anyone who falls outside of this established norm is subject to punishment: Page 22

They mistake words for things, he says. They are apathetic, narcissistic, cut off from reality, incapable of achieving transference; they resemble philosophers “an undesirable resemblance.” (AO, 23; emphasis mine) Page 23

• [N] Freud

Freud identifies a commonality between schizophrenics and philosophers, noting an “undesirable resemblance” between them, likening them to animals. This is because Freud views the schizophrenic as incapable of transference. In psychoanalytic theory, transference refers to the process by which an analysand redirects their unconscious childhood feelings and desires onto a new object, typically the therapist or psychoanalyst. Page 24

• [N] Freud's adherence to the Oedipus complex prevented him from understanding schizophrenia and desire outside this framework.
• [N] Freud disliked schizophrenics because they resist oedipalization and are seen as incapable of transference, which he views as necessary for analysis within his framework.

This section highlights Freud's limitations in approaching schizophrenia due to his commitment to the Oedipus complex. Deleuze and Guattari argue that Freud's framework, which relies on concepts like transference and the Oedipal triangle, leads him to pathologize schizophrenics for not fitting into this model. They see this as evidence of how psychoanalysis is constrained by its own theoretical structures, preventing it from grasping desire beyond familial representation.

#on/freud #on/oedipuscomplex #on/transference

Psychoanalysis: From Production to Representation

The fact is, from the moment that we are placed within the framework of Oedipus — from the moment that we are measured in terms of Oedipus — the cards are stacked against us, and the only real relationship, that of production, has been done away with. (AO, 24) Page 25

A well-known saying attributed to psychologist Abraham Maslow is relevant to this discussion: “If the only tool you have is a hammer, it is tempting to treat everything as if it were a nail.” When forced within the confines of Oedipus, we have already lost. Page 25

The great discovery of psychoanalysis was that of the production of desire, of the productions of the unconscious. (AO, 24) Page 26

Yet, with the terrifying presence of Oedipus, this discovery becomes lost within a series of symbols, all pertaining to parental figures: Page 26

But once Oedipus entered the picture, this discovery was soon buried beneath a new brand of idealism: a classical theater was substituted for the unconscious as a factory; representation was substituted for the units of production of the unconscious; and an unconscious that was capable of nothing but expressing itself — in myth, tragedy, dreams — was substituted for the productive unconscious. (AO, 24) Page 26

One of my favorite lines in the book is: “a classical theater was substituted for the unconscious as a factory.” In this passage, Deleuze and Guattari argue that Oedipus functions merely as a system of representations, reducing the unconscious to a theater with Oedipus is on stage. You want to read a blog post? Well, that’s just because you want to kill your father and have sexual relations with your mother. Page 27

Everything within Freudian psychoanalysis is reduced to Oedipus. Everything is constantly interpreted and examined. Instead, we ought to conceptualize the unconscious as a factory rather than substituting it with a classical theater with myth, tragedy, or dreams on stage. Page 27

• [N] Psychoanalysis's great discovery was the production of desire, but it was buried by the Oedipal framework.
• [N] The Oedipus complex replaces the unconscious as a factory with a classical theater, substituting representation for production and an expressive unconscious for a productive one.

This section argues that psychoanalysis, despite initially discovering the productive nature of the unconscious, became derailed by the Oedipus complex. By framing everything through Oedipal relations, psychoanalysis substituted a system of representation (a theatrical model) for the actual production of desire (a factory model), thereby losing sight of the unconscious's inherent productivity.

#on/psychoanalysis #on/unconscious #on/production

The Limits of Understanding Schizophrenia Through the Ego

Every time that the problem of schizophrenia is explained in terms of the ego, all we can do is “sample” a supposed essence or a presumed specific nature of the schizo, regardless of whether we do so with love and pity or disgustedly spit out themouthful we have tasted. (AO, 24) Page 29

Whether we areempathetic or disdainful towards the schizophrenic, the approach ofunderstanding schizophrenia through the ego is inherently problematic. Page 29

Let us remember once again one of Marx’s caveats: we cannot tell from the mere taste of wheat who grew it; the product gives us no hint as to the system and therelations of production. (AO, 24) Page 30

Just as tasting wheat doesn’t reveal who grew it or the broader agricultural system behind it, focusing solely on the ego fails to uncover the deeper processes and social relations that contribute to the development of schizophrenia and its associated symptoms. Page 31

The schizophrenic appears all the more specific and recognizable as a distinct personality if the process is halted, or if it is made an end and a goal in itself, or if it is allowed to go on and on endlessly in a void, so as to provoke that “horror of . . . extremity wherein the soul and body ultimately perish” (the autist). Kraepelin’s celebrated terminal state. . . Page 32

common understandings of schizophrenia are rooted in clinical methods, which often involve the attempt to halt the process of production or turn the process of production into an end goal — such as policing the schizophrenic and forcing conformity. The schizophrenic one finds in mental institutions is a clinical entity; Deleuze and Guattari make a clear distinction between the schizophrenic as a clinical entity and the schizophrenic as a subject traversing the body without organs, aligning with nature as a process of production. Page 32

But the moment that one describes, on the contrary, the material process of production, the specificity of the product tends to evaporate, while at the same time the possibility of another outcome, another end result of the process appears. (AO, 24) Page 33

Deleuze and Guattari argue that defining schizophrenia through the material process of production —i.e., by examining the processes by which the condition developed, much like analyzing how wheat grew and who cultivated it — leads to a similar oversimplification. By concentrating on the material processes and who was involved, we risk homogenizing every grain of wheat from a field, reducing its essence to merely who grew it. In both cases — whether through an abstract method or a material process— we fall short in defining schizophrenia. Page 34

Before being a mental state of the schizophrenic who has made himself into an artificial person through autism, schizophrenia is the process of the production of desire and desiring-machines. (AO, 24; emphasis mine) Page 35

Contrasting the concept of process with those of reaction formation or development of the personality, he views process as a rupture or intrusion, having nothing to do with an imaginary relationship with the ego; rather, it is a relationship with the “demoniacal” in nature. (AO, 25) Page 36

Jaspers finds schizophrenia to be like that of a rupture in the ongoing process of psychological development — a sudden disruption from normative processes. Page 36

The one thing Jaspers failed to do was to view process as material economic reality, as the process of production wherein Nature = Industry, Nature = History. (AO, 25) Page 37

a comprehensive understanding of schizophrenia requires connecting this rupture to broader sociohistorical processes. Page 37

• [N] Analyzing schizophrenia solely through the ego (as a "product") is like judging wheat by taste without considering its production, failing to understand the underlying processes and social relations.
• [N] Clinical understandings of schizophrenia focus on halting the process, defining the schizophrenic as a specific, often "terminal" entity.
• [N] Schizophrenia is fundamentally the process of production of desire and desiring-machines, not just a mental state or ego-related issue.
• [N] Jaspers viewed schizophrenia as a rupture in psychological development, but failed to connect this process to material economic and sociohistorical reality (Nature = Industry, Nature = History).

This section argues that understanding schizophrenia solely through the lens of the ego is insufficient, drawing a parallel to Marx's point that a product doesn't reveal its production process. They distinguish the clinical entity of schizophrenia, which focuses on halting the process, from schizophrenia as the fundamental process of desiring-production itself. While acknowledging Jaspers' view of schizophrenia as a "rupture," they criticize him for not connecting this process to material economic reality and sociohistorical conditions.

#on/schizophrenia #on/ego #on/production #on/jaspers

Desire as Production vs. Acquisition: Critique of Platonic and Kantian Idealism

To a certain degree, the traditional logic of desire is all wrong from the very outset: from the very first step that the Platonic logic of desire forces us to take, making us choose between production and acquisition. (AO, 25; emphasis mine) Page 38

For the Ancient Greek philosopher, Plato, desire is viewed as yearning for what one is lacking (i.e., I desire something because I do not have it). A central aspect of Plato’s philosophy is his Theory of Forms. According to this theory, there exists a realm beyond the material world that is constituted by perfect, unchanging Forms or Ideas. These Forms represent the true essence of all things. In Plato’s view, the material world is merely a shadow of these ideal Forms Page 38

From the moment that we place desire on the side of acquisition, we make desire an idealistic (dialectical, nihilistic) conception, which causes us to look upon it as primarily a lack: a lack of an object, a lack of the real object. (AO, 25) Page 39

When desire is framed in terms of acquisition, it is made into an idealistic, dialectical, and nihilistic concept. This perspective turns desire into an end goal, forever in search of attaining the perfect, lost object. In this manner, desire is understood in relation to lack — a deficiency or void that one seeks to fill by acquiring the lost object of desire. For the religious individual, one lacks God or holiness. For the capitalist, one lacks capital. For the psychoanalyst, one lacks the phallus. Page 39

It is true that the other side, the “production” side, has not been entirely ignored. (AO, 25) Page 40

Kant, for instance, must be credited with effecting a critical revolution as regards the theory of desire, by attributing to it “the faculty of being, through its representations, the cause of the reality of the objects of these representations.” (AO, 25; emphasis mine) Page 40

The faculty of desire is a being’s faculty to be by means of its representations the cause of the reality of the objects of these representations. (Critique of PracticalReason, 16; emphasis mine) Page 41

• [N] Kant

Kant’s view of desire departs from the traditional, Platonist notion of desirewhich conceptualizes desire in relation to acquiescence (also known aslack). For Platonism, something like hunger is understood in relation to lack: the subject lacks a sandwich (and attaining a sandwich would attempt to fulfill this lack). However, for Kant, desire is a productive force as “thefaculty of being” — that is, human faculties (i.e., the subject’s mind) —represent objects and thus contribute to their existence. To use the previousexample, Kant believes that when one is hungry, desire produces an image of a sandwich in the subject’s mind which causes the subject to go out and make a sandwich (or buy one) Page 42

Kant argues that desire is tied to the capacity for representation, meaningthat objects of desire can exist conceptually in the mind even if they are notphysically present. This approach emphasizes that desire involves an active process of representation(s), where the mind plays a crucial role in the existence and experience of desired objects. Page 43

Kant maintains that desireshould be conceptualized as the capacity to represent and potentially realizeobjects, regardless of whether every instance of desire results in actual outcomes Page 43

But it is not by chance that Kant chooses superstitious beliefs, hallucinations, and fantasies as illustrations of this definition of desire: as Kant would have it, we arewell aware that the real object can be produced only by an external causality and external mechanisms; nonetheless this knowledge does not prevent us from believing in the intrinsic power of desire to create its own object — if only in anunreal, hallucinatory, or delirious form — or from representing this causality as stemming from within desire itself. (AO, 25) Page 44

… The basic phenomenon of hallucination (I see, I hear) and the basicphenomenon of delirium (I think . . . ) presuppose an I feel at an even deeper level, which gives hallucinations their object and thought delirium its content. (AO, 18; emphasis mine Page 45

Rather than conceptualizing desire as a process of production along with the sensations that produce subjectivity, Kant is limited in his view of desire as solely mental representations. Page 45

In Kant’s framework, desire in relation to lack or acquisition persists. Kant’sfocus on representations and “psychic realities” highlights the erroneousnotion that mental constructs and “psychic realities” are separate from anactualized, material reality. Kant’s understanding of desire asserts thatwhen a subject desires, wishes, or hallucinates an object, this very subject islacking something and fundamentally divorced from these objects. (Kantfails to take into account desiring-production, partial objects as he isstarting from the position of a global person.) Thus, while desire mayproduce mental images or representations of objects, these representations are a means to address what the subject is lacking or missing in the materialworld. Page 47

There is no psychic reality, desire, wish, or series of hallucinations that exist independently from the subject being produced by feelings and sensations. The “I feel” precedes everything. Page 47

In point of fact, if desire is the lack of the real object, its very nature as a real entity depends upon an “essence of lack” that produces the fantasized object. (AO, 25) Page 48

Desire thus conceived of as production, though merely the production of fantasies, has been explained perfectly by psychoanalysis. (AO, 25) Page 48

if desire is fundamentally linked tolack or acquisition, then the fantasized objects inherently possess an“essence of lack.” Page 48

• [N] Platonic logic views desire as acquisition, stemming from a lack of a real object, leading to an idealistic and nihilistic conception.
• [N] Kant introduced the idea of desire as a productive faculty (producing representations), but his focus on mental representations and "psychic realities" still operates within a framework of lack and is disconnected from the material reality of desiring-production and the primacy of "I feel" sensations.
• [N] Psychoanalysis has perfectly explained desire conceived as production of fantasy, but this still relies on the premise that desire is rooted in lack, which creates a fantasized object.

This section critiques the traditional philosophical understanding of desire, starting with the Platonic concept of desire as acquisition stemming from lack. While acknowledging Kant's step toward viewing desire as productive (through representation), Deleuze and Guattari argue that Kant's framework remains idealistic, focusing on mental representation rather than material production. They contend that even psychoanalysis's understanding of desire as producing fantasy is based on the erroneous premise of desire originating from lack.

#on/desire #on/plato #on/kant #on/lack #on/idealism

Fantasy as Group Fantasy, Not Individual

Thus fantasy is never individual: it is group fantasy — as institutional analysis has successfully demonstrated. (AO, 30; emphasis mine) Page 90

Guattari engaged with Lacanian concepts and reinterpreted them. Within the framework of “institutional psychotherapy,” Guattari preferred the term “institutional analysis,” framing his work as a political endeavor. As a result, fantasies conceptualized by psychoanalyis were always individual; in reality, fantasies are always collective, shaped by groups. Page 90

One way to conceptualize group fantasies is through collective identities, such as ‘being a man or woman’ or ‘being an American.’ These identities are not inherent to the individual; they are constructed and maintained by groups, shaped through collective identity formations and social norms. Page 91

And if there is such a thing as two sorts of group fantasy, it is because two different readings of this identity are possible, depending upon whether the desiringmachines are regarded from the point of view of the great gregarious masses that they form, or whether social machines are considered from the point of view of the elementary forces of desire that serve as a basis for them. (AO, 30) Page 91

On one hand, group fantasies are shaped by the production of ‘great gregarious masses’ through desiring-machines, and on the other hand, they are influenced by social machines, which are grounded in the ‘elementary forces of desire.’ Ultimately, both perspectives point to the same conclusion: desiring-production and social production are inseparable, functioning as two aspects of the same process. Page 91

Within group fantasy, energy may be invested in a repressive manner or a revolutionary one Page 92

Hence in group fantasy the libido may invest all of an existing social field, including the latter’s most repressive forms; or on the contrary, it may launch a counterinvestment whereby revolutionary desire is plugged into the existing social field as a source of energy. (AO, 30) Page 92

(The great socialist Utopias of the nineteenth century function, for example, not as ideal models but as group fantasies — that is, as agents of the real productivity of desire, making it possible to disinvest the current social field, to “deinstitutionalize” it, to further the revolutionary institution of desire itself.) (AO, 30–31; emphasis mine) Page 92

these utopias — according to Deleuze and Guattari — function as ‘group fantasies’ in the sense that they reflect the collective aspirations of specific social groups rather than serving as rigid blueprints for future society. Page 92

• [N] Institutional analysis shows that fantasy is collective (group fantasy), not individual, shaped by groups and collective identities.
• [N] Group fantasies can be understood from the perspective of desiring-machines forming masses or social machines based on desire's elementary forces, both pointing to the inseparability of desiring-production and social production.
• [N] Libidinal energy in group fantasy can either reinforce repressive social forms or fuel revolutionary counterinvestment.
• [N] Socialist utopias function as group fantasies, acting as agents of desire's productivity to disinvest and "deinstitutionalize" the current social field, promoting a revolutionary institution of desire.

This section introduces the concept of "group fantasy," arguing against the psychoanalytic notion of individual fantasy. Drawing on institutional analysis, they posit that fantasies are collective phenomena shaped by groups and social norms. Group fantasies are manifestations of the interplay between desiring-machines forming masses and social machines based on desire, highlighting the unity of desiring-production and social production. This collective energy can be directed repressively or towards revolutionary change, with socialist utopias cited as examples of revolutionary group fantasies.

#on/groupfantasy #on/institutionalanalysis #on/utopia

Desiring-Machines and Technical Machines: Differences in Régime

But there is never any difference in nature between the desiring-machines and the technical social machines. There is a certain distinction between them, but it is merely a distinction of régime,* depending on their relationships of size. Except for this difference in régime, they are the same machines, as group fantasies clearly prove. (AO, 31) Page 93

When in the course of our discussion above, we laid down the broad outlines of a parallelism between social production and desiring-production, in order to show that in both cases there is a strong tendency on the part of the forces of antiproduction to operate retroactively on (se rabattre sur) productive forms and appropriate them, this parallelism was in no way meant as an exhaustive description of the relationship between the two systems of production. (AO, 31) Page 94

[The parallelism] merely enables us to point to certain phenomena having to do with the difference in régime between them. (AO, 31) Page 95

In the first place, technical machines obviously work only if they are not out of order; they ordinarily stop working not because they break down but because they wear out. (AO, 31; emphasis mine) Page 95

Simondon gives a simple explanation of the technical object that we call the ‘tool’: Page 95

Take a tool. What is essential in a tool? It is an intermediary between the body of the operator and the things on which [the operator] acts... In order to be a good tool: be unbreakable, be well-constituted. Page 95

• [N] Simondon

Technical machines operate by maintaining an order of arrangements within an ensemble, and akin to desiring-machines, they function through a continuous process of breaking down. In other words, they work through a process of becoming and adaptation. These breakdowns reveal the limits (and potentiality) of their current configurations, opening up possibilities for reconfiguration. However, they do stop working under the condition of their deterioriation or their ‘wearing out.’ Page 96

Marx makes use of this simple principle to show that the régime of technical machines is characterized by a strict distinction between the means of production and the product; thanks to this distinction, the machine transmits value to the product, but only the value that the machine itself loses as it wears out. (AO, 31) Page 96

Marx makes a strategic move where he isolates that a technical machine does not add intrinsic value to the product it produces — at least in the sense of “creating” value; rather, a technical machine simply transfers value to the product as the technical machine wears down. The product’s value is dependent on the depreciation of the machine that produces it. Page 97

Desiring-machines, on the contrary, continually break down as they run, and in fact run only when they are not functioning properly: the product is always an offshoot of production, implanting itself upon it like a graft, and at the same time the parts of the machine are the fuel that makes it run. (AO, 31) Page 97

Unlike technical machines, desiring-machines only function through wearing out or “not functioning properly.” While technical machines operate by breaking down, they only continue to work as long as they are not wearing out; they transfer value to the product through their deterioration, until they eventually dissolve. In contrast, desiring-machines work through their breakdowns, or more precisely, through their wearing out, where the product emerges within the ongoing process of production, alongside desiring-machines. Page 97

Consider this example to sum up our progression: If someone works at a shoe factory and operates a technical shoe machine, the shoe machine will gradually wear down over time as it produces shoes, and transfers its value to the shoes, leading to its eventual dissolution. However, the machine remains functional as long as it is in working order and undergoing breakdowns. It is only once the machine has fully worn out that it ceases to function. Page 97

• [N] Desiring-machines and technical/social machines are the same in nature but differ in "régime" or mode of operation.
• [N] Technical machines work by functioning correctly until they wear out, transmitting value to the product as they depreciate (Marx). There is a distinction between means of production and product.
• [N] Desiring-machines function through breakdown ("not functioning properly"), with the product emerging as a graft within the process itself and machine parts serving as fuel. The distinction between production and product is blurred.

This section clarifies the relationship between desiring-machines and technical/social machines, stating they are the same in nature but differ in their "régime." Technical machines operate correctly and transmit value as they wear out, maintaining a distinction between production means and product. Desiring-machines, conversely, function through breakdown and wearing out, with the product emerging directly from the ongoing process of production, blurring the lines between means and product. This difference in operational mode (régime) distinguishes them despite their shared fundamental nature.

#on/desiringmachines #on/technicalmachines #on/regime

Art as a Desiring-Machine Disrupting Social Production

Paragraph Sixteen Page 98

Art often takes advantage of this property of desiring-machines by creating veritable group fantasies in which desiring-production is used to short-circuit social production, and to interfere with the reproductive function of technical machines by introducing an element of dysfunction. (AO, 31) Page 98

Art creates collective fantasies that resonate beyond individuals, influencing society as a whole. Art, consumed in a raw and unregulated way, bypasses the norms of social production. Unlike technical machines, which transfer value to their products through their ‘wearing out’, art is produced alongside desiring-machines, disrupting technical machines and social machines, serving as “an element of dysfunction.” Now, none of this assumes that art cannot be commodified by capitalism; Deleuze and Guattari are solely analyzing how art can short-circuit social production. Page 98

Arman’s charred violins, for instance, or Cesar’s compressed car bodies. More generally, Dali’s method of critical paranoia assures the explosion of a desiringmachine within an object of social production. (AO, 31) Page 99

The emphasis on Dali’s “critical paranoia” seems to be Deleuze and Guattari praising Dali for successfully harnessing and intensifying desiringproduction in such a manner that disrupts social norms, figures, bodies, and established normative perceptions. By deliberately blurring the boundaries between reality and fantasy, allowing them to collapse upon one another, the unconscious is deemed as part of the production process. Page 99

But even earlier, Ravel preferred to throw his inventions entirely out of gear rather than let them simply run down, and chose to end his compositions with abrupt breaks, hesitations, tremolos, discordant notes, and unresolved chords, rather than allowing them to slowly wind down to a close or gradually die away into silence. (AO, 31–32) Page 102

Ravel’s Une Barque sur l’Océan is one of my favorite pieces. It truly captures the feeling of a boat drifting on the ocean (hence its name). You can listen to it here. I also highly recommend Ravel’s Boléro — a must-hear piece of music. Listen to it here. Page 103

The artist is the master of objects; he puts before us shattered, burned, brokendown objects, converting them to the régime of desiring-machines, breaking down is part of the very functioning of desiring-machines; the artist presents paranoiac machines, miraculating-machines, and celibate machines as so many technical machines, so as to cause desiring-machines to undermine technical machines. (AO, 32) Page 103

Deleuze and Guattari emphasize the signifiance of the artist’s unconventional nature, using “broken-down objects” as a key element. They associate this breakdown with the functioning of desiring-machines; they argue that the machines found in the second and third syntheses of unconscious are portrayed as technical machines, suggesting that art breaks down the technical machines of desiring-production while simultaneously interfering with their reproduction at the level of social production. Page 104

Even more important, the work of art is itself a desiring-machine. The artist stores up his treasures so as to create an immediate explosion, and that is why, to his way of thinking, destructions can never take place as rapidly as they ought to. (AO, 32; emphasis mine) Page 104

This depiction of art being a desiring-machine fully captures the idea that artistry short-circuits social production by adding various elements of dysfunction that explode upon the medium by which the art is being conveyed and produced. Page 104

technical machines must function properly in order to transmit value to a product. Through this transmission of value, the machine undergoes wear and tear, leading to its dissolution. Whereas desiring-machines, like music, are not transmitting value to a product because the product is being grafted upon the production process. (What is the product present as you are listening to a song?) Page 105

• [N] Art leverages the property of desiring-machines (functioning through breakdown) to create group fantasies that short-circuit social production and disrupt technical machines.
• [N] Examples like Arman's work, Cesar's sculptures, Dali's critical paranoia, and Ravel's musical style demonstrate how artists use dysfunction and explosion to undermine social production and conventional forms.
• [N] The work of art itself is a desiring-machine, creating immediate explosions rather than gradual processes, unlike technical machines that transmit value through wear.

This section explores how art functions as a desiring-machine to disrupt social production. Artists utilize the characteristic "breakdown" mode of desiring-machines to create group fantasies that interfere with the reproductive function of technical/social machines. Examples from visual art (Arman, Cesar, Dali) and music (Ravel) illustrate this disruptive potential. The work of art itself is presented as a desiring-machine that short-circuits established processes through rapid, explosive creation.

#on/art #on/desiringmachines #on/socialproduction

The Socius as Analogue to the Body Without Organs and the Role of Repression

From this, a second difference in régime results: desiring-machines produce antiproduction all by themselves, whereas the antiproduction characteristic of technical machines takes place only within the extrinsic conditions of the reproduction of the process (even though these conditions do not come into being at some “later stage”). (AO, 32) Page 106

In the three syntheses of the unconscious, we see the antiproductive nature of the body without organs fall back on the process of production, appropriating the surplus energy of desiring-production for itself. This results in desiring-machines producing antiproduction through their interactions upon the body without organs. However, technical machines do not produce antiproduction on their own. Instead, their antiproduction arises within the “extrinsic conditions of the reproduction of the process.” In simpler terms, technical machines must refer back to a socius or social machine. Page 106

That is why technical machines are not an economic category, and always refer back to a socius or a social machine that is quite distinct from these machines, and that conditions this reproduction. (AO, 32; emphasis mine) Page 106

A technical machine is therefore not a cause but merely an index of a general form of social production: thus there are manual machines and primitive societies, hydraulic machines and “Asiatic” forms of society, industrial machines and capitalism. (AO, 32) Page 107

Manual machines refer to the devices developed in early societies, from the Paleolithic and Neolithic eras and some continuing eras thereafter. These machines are simple and what Simondon described as abstract technical objects. These devices rely on human labor for operation, rather than external energy sources such as water or steam. Page 107

Hydraulic machines refer to devices developed by “Asiatic” societies that use liquid (specifically water) to perform processes. These machines were common in early industrial processes serving an important role in irrigation and milling. For example, ancient Greece and Rome particularly had sophisticated hydraulic machines like those of watermills and pioneers in hydraulic engineering. Other significant hydraulic machines were chain pumps, like those developed in ancient China. Even though chain pumps require some amount of labor, it makes the process much more efficient as the pump moves water upwards without requiring constant manual labor. Page 109

Industrial machines refer to devices developed by capitalist societies in order to increase capitalist production; these devices can look like factories, tools, and engines that contribute to the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities. These machines produce goods in a structured fashion. A specific example that comes to mind is Henry Ford’s moving assembly line as seen in Figure Sixty-Three. Page 111

Deleuze and Guattari’s primary concern is not with rigid classifications of machines, but rather with which types of machines dominate the socius at a given time, shaping production and social organization. Page 113

As we have outlined the second distinction in régime between desiringmachines and technical machines (with the technical machines being indexical to their corresponding socius), Deleuze and Guattari emphasize that while desiring-production and social production are the same with two differences in régime, there remains a crucial distinction Page 114

Hence when we posited the socius as the analogue of a full body without organs, there was nonetheless one important difference. (AO, 32) Page 114

To grasp this crucial difference between desiring-machines and the socius, Deleuze and Guattari first explain that desiring-machines make no distinctions between anything: Page 114

For desiring-machines are the fundamental category of the economy of desire; they produce a body without organs all by themselves, and make no distinction between agents and their own parts, or between the relations of production and their own relations, or between the social order and technology. (AO, 32) Page 115

From the standpoint of desiring-machines, everything is interconnected through various emissions and interruptions of flows that pass through them; unlike social production, desiring-production finds that there is no distinction between the socius and technical machines that are produced externally by them. Similarly, there is no distinction between an agent and the parts that make up that agent. Page 115

Desiring-machines are both technical and social. (AO, 32) Page 115

the fundamental distinction between desiring-production and social production lies in where repression takes place: Page 115

It is in this sense that desiring-production is the locus of a primal psychic repression*, whereas social production is where social repression takes place, and it is between the former and the latter that there occurs something that resembles secondary psychic repression in the “strictest” sense: the situation of the body without organs or its equivalent is the crucial factor here, depending on whether it is the result of an internal process or of an extrinsic condition (and thus affects the role of the death instinct in particular). (AO, 32; emphasis mine) Page 115

1974 English Translation: This ‘primal repression’ determines repression in the strict sense of the term, which is only made possible by the concerted action, upon the elements destined to be repressed, of a force of repulsion exerted by a higher agency and an attraction exerted by what has already been fixated. Page 116

• [N] Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis

Freud saw primary repression as a foundational mechanism that blocks unconscious desires from reaching conscious awareness. Once this primary repression is in place, it sets the stage for the mind to repress new, conscious thoughts or feelings as they arise. For example, if a child experiences sexual curiosity by touching their genitals and is told that such feelings and actions are ‘shameful’ or ‘bad,’ that impulse is repressed and kept out of conscious awareness (primary repression), meaning the child is unable to fully acknowledge the desire due to the external prohibition. Later in life, when this person, now an adult, experiences sexual arousal, they may also feel guilt as a result of this early repression (secondary repression). Thus, for Freud, the guilt associated with sexual arousal is the outcome of a secondary repression arising from a foundational primary repression. Page 117

In contrast to Freud, who suggests that secondary repression arises when repressed thoughts resurface on top of a pre-established primary repression, Deleuze and Guattari argue that repression is always primal and in the context of the paranoiac-machine. When psychoanalysis speaks of primary repression, they are really only speaking of paranoiac-machines. The term “primary repression” suggests a type of succession that Deleuze and Guattari are cautious of, while the word “primal” is much better as it enables us to conceptualize repression at the level of machines without succession. Deleuze and Guattari argue that it is not the ‘return of repressed’ impulses that leads to a secondary repression, but rather the tension between desiring-production (psychic repression) and social production (social repression) which creates something that resembles secondary repression. Page 118

According to the three syntheses, if the subject is continually recreated, then how could secondary repression even exist? Everything is fundamentally produced primarily as in primal; nothing can be secondary. In the second synthesis, paranoiac-machine functions as “primal repression,” repelling desiring-machines. This repulsion suspends connections between machines. Simultaneously, a miraculating-machine functions to attract desiring-machines back to the surface of the body without organs. For example, a mouth-machine disconnects from a breast-machine, connect to another machine, and then disconnect from that machine, initiating a series of re-couplings. Then, in the third synthesis, the “celibate machine” functions as a form of “return of the repressed,” reconciling the tension between paranoiac and miraculating machines and banding these intensities produced by the paranoiac and miraculating-machines into a consumable quantity for the subject (see Chapter 1.3, Paragraph One). Page 118

To put simply, a subject is reborn with each state that they consume: a mouth-machine disconnects from a breast-machine and turns into a vomiting-machine; a hand-machine is swatted away from a genitalmachine; an eye-machine connects to a pornography-machine; an adult encounters an infidelity-machine; a person is subjected to the moral judgements of a religious-machine. All of these experiences produce the the subject without reawakening buried impulses — repression is immanently produced upon the body without organs. Deleuze and Guattari emphasize that whatever resembles a secondary repression results from the continuous interaction between psychic repression and social repression (but this doesn’t constitute repression as secondary). Repression is not merely rooted in childhood prohibitions, such as hearing that sex is “shameful”; it’s about the ongoing interaction between psychic and social repression, all unfolding on the body without organs. Page 119

And finally, the death instinct mentioned here refers to the drive toward destruction, which emerges from the interplay between desiring-production and social production. Earlier, we explored how death is something that desire desires — but not in a negative sense. However, the role of death changes depending on the specific relationship between the body without organs and what resembles secondary psychic repression. Whether the repression stems from an internal process or an external one shifts the nature of this death drive from a positive, productive force into a destructive one. Page 119

• [N] Desiring-machines inherently produce antiproduction (via the Body without Organs), while technical machines' antiproduction requires external social conditions (the socius).
• [N] Technical machines are indices of social production forms (manual/primitive, hydraulic/Asiatic, industrial/capitalist), not causes of them.
• [N] Desiring-machines make no distinction between agents, parts, relations of production, or social order/technology; they are fundamentally both technical and social.
• [N] Desiring-production is the site of primal psychic repression, while social production is the site of social repression. The tension between these resembles secondary psychic repression.
• [N] Unlike Freud's concept of secondary repression building upon a fixed primary repression, Deleuze and Guattari see repression as always primal and immanent to the process. What resembles secondary repression arises from the dynamic interaction of psychic and social repression on the Body without Organs.
• [N] The death instinct's role shifts from productive to destructive based on whether repression is internal (desiring-production) or external (social production).

This section delves into the second difference in régime: desiring-machines produce antiproduction intrinsically, linked to primal psychic repression, whereas technical machines require external social conditions (the socius) for antiproduction (social repression). Technical machines are thus seen as indicators of social production forms, not their cause. The socius is presented as an analogue to the Body without Organs, but distinct. Desiring-machines are fundamentally technical and social, making no internal distinctions. The tension between desiring-production (psychic repression) and social production (social repression) produces something resembling secondary repression, which is understood not as a return of the repressed but as an ongoing process on the Body without Organs.

#on/desiringmachines #on/technicalmachines #on/socius #on/repression #on/bodywithoutorgans

The Unity of Production and the Twofold Nature of Reality

But at the same time [desiring-machines and technical social machines] are the same machines, despite the fact that they are governed by two different régimes and despite the fact that it is admittedly a strange adventure for desire to desire repression. (AO, 32) Page 120

desire itself seeks its own repression. Page 120

There is only one kind of production, the production of the real. (AO, 32; emphasis mine) Page 121

And doubtless we can express this identity in two different ways, even though these two ways together constitute the autoproduction of the unconscious as a cycle. (AO, 32–33; emphasis mine) Page 121

“This identity” is the shared unified essence of production in both desiring-production and social production. Page 121

All they are saying is that the production of the real can be expressed in two manners (desiring-production and social production). Page 121

We can say that social production, under determinate conditions, derives primarily from desiring-production: which is to say that Homo natura comes first. But we must also say, more accurately, that desiring-production is first and foremost social in nature, and tends to free itself only at the end: which is to say that Homo historia comes first. (AO, 33) Page 122

For to translate man back into nature; to master the many vain and fanciful interpretations and secondary meanings which have been hitherto scribbled and daubed over that eternal basic text homo natura; to confront man henceforth with man in the way in which, hardened by the discipline of science, man today confronts the rest of nature, with dauntless Oedipus eyes and stopped up Odysseus ears... (Beyond Good and Evil; Section 230; emphasis mine) Page 122

• [N] Nietzsche

because desiring-production produces social production, from one perspective nature comes first; from yet another perspective, desiring-production is naturally social, therefore history (or the social) comes first. Once again, the distinction is an arbitrary one, only different in terms of régime. Page 122

The body without organs is not an original primordial entity that later projects itself into different sorts of socius, as though it were a raving paranoiac, the chieftain of the primitive horde, who was initially responsible for social organization. (AO, 33) Page 123

the body without organs should not be seen as the origin of the socius. Instead, the socius is formed through social production recording points on the surface of the socius. It seems that Deleuze and Guattari as pointing to the socius as having a seemingly divine or almost mystical presence (similar to Marx’s commodity fetishism); however, they are clear that this is not a question of projection by the body without organs. Page 123

The social machine or socius may be the body of the Earth, the body of the Despot, the body of Money. (AO, 33) Page 124

Deleuze and Guattari isolate the three socii found in Chapter Three: the primitive socius (the body of the Earth), the despotic socius (the body of the Despot), and the capitalist socius (the body of Money). Yet, the socii are not a projection of the body without organs: Page 124

It is never a projection, however, of the body without organs. On the contrary: the body without organs is the ultimate residuum of a deterritorialized socius. (AO, 33; emphasis mine) Page 124

a territory refers to a space that is controlled and regulated while the concept of deterritorialization involves the breaking down and disruption of the boundaries that constitute the territory. Page 124

the body without organs is a residuum. The body without organs is produced by the syntheses while serving as a fundamental foundation for the syntheses operation. In the case of the socius, the body without organs emerges as the ultimate residuum a surface upon which social production inscribes points onto. Page 124

• [N] Despite differences in régime, desiring-machines and social machines are fundamentally the same, and there is only one kind of production: the production of the real.
• [N] This single production can be expressed in two ways: social production derived from desiring-production (Homo natura first) or desiring-production being primarily social (Homo historia first). This distinction is one of perspective (régime).
• [N] The Body without Organs is not the origin of the socius; rather, it is the residual outcome of a deterritorialized socius.

This section asserts the fundamental unity of desiring-production and social production as aspects of the single production of the real, differing only in "régime." This unity can be viewed from two perspectives, emphasizing either Homo natura (desire producing the social) or Homo historia (desire as fundamentally social), but this distinction is artificial. They clarify that the Body without Organs is not the origin of the socius but rather the residual outcome of a deterritorialized social body.

#on/production #on/thereal #on/bodywithoutorgans #on/socius

Capitalism: Decoding, Reterritorialization, and the Schizophrenic Limit

The prime function incumbent upon the socius, has always been to codify the flows of desire, to inscribe them, to record them, to see to it that no flow exists that is not properly dammed up, channeled, regulated. (AO, 33) Page 124

The primary role the social production in relation to the socius has always been to codify, inscribe, and regulate the flows of desire. This ensures that no flow remains uncontrolled or unchanneled. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the socius functions as a surface that governs all desire, leaving no flow unregulated or without boundaries; desire becomes regulated and mapped out into a charted territory. Page 125

When the primitive territorial machine proved inadequate to the task, the despotic machine set up a kind of overcoding system. But the capitalist machine, insofar as it was built on the ruins of a despotic State more or less far removed in time, finds itself in a totally new situation: it is faced with the task of decoding and deterritorializing the flows. (AO, 33; emphasis mine) Page 126

the primitive socius was overtaken by the despotic socius and the despotic socius was overtaken by the “capitalist machine” (the capitalist socius). Page 126

Capitalism, unlike the primitive and despotic socius, does something radical. Instead of coding, channeling, and regulating the flows of desire tightly, capitalism decodes and deterritorializes the flows of desire. Page 126

Capitalism does not confront this situation from the outside, since it experiences it as the very fabric of its existence, as both its primary determinant and its fundamental raw material, its form and its function, and deliberately perpetuates it, in all its violence, with all the powers at its command. Its sovereign production and repression can be achieved in no other way. (AO, 33) Page 126

The deterritorialization of the flows of desire constitutes the “fabric of [capitalism’s] existence.” What is important here is that capitalism can function in no other manner except deterritorialization. Page 126

Capitalism is in fact born of the encounter of two sorts of flows: the decoded flows of production in the form of money-capital, and the decoded flows of labor in the form of the “free worker.” (AO, 33; emphasis mine) Page 127

Firstly, instead of applying fixed codes found in earlier societies, capitalism decodes flows of production by using money as a universal stand-in across the production process. This decoding of production allows for diverse types of labor, goods, and services to be unified under a single, universally applicable measure: money. Unlike barter and traditional trade, money circulates across industries and borders as a purely quantitive measure of worth, untethered from any specific cultural or local meaning. Page 127

Secondly, instead of fixing labor in place through social codes, capitalism decodes labor in order to make it universally exchangeable. Decoding labor implies eradicating fixed, local meaning tied to work and labor, allowing workers to move freely from one space to the next in order to sell their labor. This enables labor itself to become a commodity, something that can be bought and sold like any other good, based on supply and demand rather than traditional roles or relationships. Page 128

Capitalism only decodes flows; therefore, it differs from all previous socii: Page 128

Hence, unlike previous social machines, the capitalist machine is incapable of providing a code that will apply to the whole of the social field. (AO, 33) Page 128

By substituting money for the very notion of a code, it has created an axiomatic of abstract quantities that keeps moving further and further in the direction of the deterritorialization of the socius. (AO, 33) Page 129

as production is decoded into money — with capitalism substituting money for code — money becomes an “axiomatic” in capitalist society. Money organizes production not according to specific codes pertaining to social values or needs, but through abstract quantities. This means that money is no longer merely a medium of exchange; money becomes a universal measure of value that operates beyond particular social relations. Instead of being tied to specific cultural or social contexts, money quantifies everything, reducing good, services, labor, and even social practices into calculable units. Page 129

Everything from labor to leisure has a price: a loaf of bread costs $4, an hour of labor costs $7.25, and a work of art can be valued at $1,000,000. These prices are determined by market forces, based on supply, demand, and other economic factors. Even if something has sentimental value or personal meaning, the capitalist socius has a way of assigning it a market price through the decoding of production into what we call ‘money.’ Life itself is framed within a cost structure — hence the term “cost of living.” Page 130

Capitalism tends toward a threshold of decoding that will destroy the socius in order to make it a body without organs and unleash the flows of desire on this body as a deterritorialized field. (AO, 33) Page 130

When they refer to capitalism “destroying the socius,” they are describing how capitalism decodes and deterritorializes flows, seemingly disorganizing flows in a way that produces the body without organs (the body without organs refuses to become organized, so capitalism’s decoding of flows is in line with the production of the body without organs; and, as described in Chapter 1.2, capital is a body without organs for the capitalist figure). However, capitalism is always only pushing towards this threshold rather than surpassing it; capitalism tends towards this threshold but always functions within the limit of capital. Capitalism cannot transcend the limit of capital because it is bound by the limit of capital. Page 130

capitalism attempts to break down the regulated flows of desire. In this way, capitalism tending towards a schizophrenic limit breaks down the regulated flows of desire. Page 131

Is it correct to say that in this sense schizophrenia is the product of the capitalist machine, as manic-depression and paranoia are the product of the despotic machine, and hysteria the product of the territorial machine?* (AO, 33) Page 132

“On hysteria, schizophrenia, and their relationships with social structures, see the analyses by Georges Devereux in his Essais d’ethnopsychiatrie generale ... and the wonderful pages in Karl Jaspers' Strindberg und Van Gogh ... The question has been asked: is madness in our time "a state of total sincerity, in areas where in less chaotic times one would have been capable of honest experience and expression without it?" Jaspers reformulates this question by adding: ''We have seen that in former times human beings attempted to drive themselves into hysteria; and we might say that today many human beings attempt to drive themselves into madness in much the same way. But if the former attempt was to a certain extent psychologically possible, the latter is not possible at all, and can lead only to inauthenticity." Page 132

By highlighting French ethnologist George Devereux and Jaspers (who we discussed earlier), Deleuze and Guattari post a critical question: whether specific forms of madness are tied to distinct historical modes of production — schizophrenia to capitalism, paranoia and manic-depression to despotism, and hysteria to the primitive socius. Devereux’s 1970 text Essais d’ethnopsychiatrie générale argues that mental illnesses like hysteria and schizophrenia are culturally contingent, shaped by the norms and structures of their respective societies. Jaspers, in his 1922 text (though Deleuze and Guattari reference the version published in 1926) Strindberg und Van Gogh, describes how earlier societies fostered forms of madness as authentic existential experiences (i.e., madness was deemed as an authentic experience with spiritual significance). However, Jaspers states that modern humans are incapable of producing authentic forms of madness, believing that this drive towards madness is inauthentic due to madness being pathologized and medicalized. Deleuze and Guattari engage with these thinkers but heavily expand upon their ideas; the material conditions of society, for Deleuze and Guattari, are responsible for these shifts in madness — an analysis that Jaspers lacks Page 132

When Deleuze and Guattari ask if schizophrenia is the product of capitalism, they could be denoting both schizophrenia as a clinical entity or schizophrenia as a process of decoding and deterritorializing flows. In the first case, they may be noting the intimate relationship between clinical conditions and the socii that they are produced in: Does capitalism produce the “crazy” schizophrenics we see in psychiatric institutions? In the second case, this question may be referring to schizophrenia as a process rather than a clinical condition (i.e., the process of decoding and deterritorializing flows): Does capitalism produce schizophrenia as a process that decodes flows of production and labor? In this second case, schizophrenia as a process is intrinsically linked to capitalism. Regardless, Deleuze and Guattar; question serves essential to conceptualizing various maladies like schizophrenia, manic-depression, along with hysteria, and how they relate to the various modes of social production that they are produced in. Page 133

• [N] The socius's primary function is to codify and regulate flows of desire.
• [N] Unlike primitive and despotic societies which coded/overcoded flows, capitalism decodes and deterritorializes flows of production (money-capital) and labor (free worker).
• [N] Capitalism substitutes money for code, creating an "axiomatic" of abstract quantities that drives the deterritorialization of the socius. Money quantifies everything and is untethered from specific social or cultural meanings.
• [N] Capitalism tends towards a "schizophrenic limit" by decoding flows, aiming to turn the socius into a Body without Organs, but it is bound by the limit of capital and cannot fully achieve this.
• [N] The question is raised whether specific "madnesses" (schizophrenia, paranoia/manic-depression, hysteria) are products of specific socii (capitalism, despotism, primitive), linking psychological states to sociohistorical modes of production.

This section contrasts capitalism with previous social formations (primitive, despotic) based on how they handle flows of desire. While earlier socii codified and regulated desire, capitalism's core function is decoding and deterritorializing flows (money-capital, free labor). By substituting money for code, capitalism creates an axiomatic of abstract quantities that pushes towards a "schizophrenic limit," aiming to unleash flows on a deterritorialized Body without Organs. However, capitalism is constrained by the limit of capital, constantly tending towards but not fully reaching this limit. This leads to the question of whether schizophrenia (as clinical entity or process) is specifically a product of the capitalist machine, unlike other "madnesses" tied to different social formations.

#on/capitalism #on/decoding #on/deterritorialization #on/socius #on/schizophrenia

Capitalism's Counteracted Tendency: Decoding and Recoding

Paragraph Nineteen Page 134

The decoding of flows and the deterritorialization of the socius thus constitutes the most characteristic and the most important tendency of capitalism. It continually draws near to its limit, which is a genuinely schizophrenic limit. (AO, 34; emphasis mine) Page 134

Capitalism constantly approaches a limit, as it “tends toward a threshold of decoding.” However, this limit is not fixed; it’s a schizophrenic limit, meaning it’s perpetually pushed further because capitalism itself decodes the boundaries it reaches. Yet, capitalism also depends on the existence of capital (hence, it depends upon on a limit), which prevents it from transcending the limit of capital altogether. Page 134

[Capitalism] tends, with all the strength at its command, to produce the schizo as the subject of the decoded flows on the body without organs — more capitalist than the capitalist and more proletarian than the proletariat. (AO, 34) Page 135

Capitalism, in all its power, drives toward the creation of the schizophrenic subject. As capital functions as a body without organs (presenting itself as a surface of inscription for social production), capitalism propels the emergence of the schizophrenic subject traversing its surface. This schizo subject embodies something “more capitalist than the capitalist and more proletarian than the proletariat” — a figure capable of generating capital while simultaneously destroying the very structures that generate capital. Page 135

as capitalism’s process of decoding approaches the limit of capital, capitalism tends towards the schizophrenic limit which pushes the limit of the socius further back: Page 135

This tendency is being carried further and further, to the point that capitalism with all its flows may dispatch itself straight to the moon: we really haven’t seen anything yet! (AO, 34) Page 135

Capitalism, by decoding flows of desire, aims to dismantle the very socius upon which it depends; in doing so, capital is produced as a body without organs (specifically, through the decoding of production and labor). We must not forget that the three syntheses are at work here: capital serves as a surface of recording that becomes produced by social production recording points on this surface. However, through this ongoing decoding process, capitalism approaches a schizophrenic limit (schizophrenia = decoding of flows). And as capitalism approaches this limit, it simultaneously pushes this limit further back due to capitalism producing the schizophrenic-subject traversing the surface of capital. This schizo subject is capable of generating capital while simultaneously destroying the structures by which capital is produced: “more capitalist than the capitalist and more proletarian than the proletariat.” Page 136

When we say that schizophrenia is our characteristic malady, the malady of our era, we do not merely mean to say that modern life drives people mad. It is not a question of a way of life, but of a process of production. (AO, 34) Page 137

Deleuze and Guattari make it clear that they are not merely reducing schizophrenia as the classical clinical diagnosis. Instead, they describe schizophrenia as a process of production. In their critique of capitalism, they argue that the “illness of our time” reflects a decoding of flows; schizophrenia here is not about individual madness, but a systemic process purported by and through capitalism. The sickness they refer are referring to is a societal condition, where capitalism’s decoding of desire has led to routine 9-to-5 jobs, environmental destruction, hoarding of resources, and exploitation of others — all of which have become normalized. This is sickness. None of this assumes that the people we find in psychiatric institutes are not schizophrenic; rather, Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization of schizophrenia goes beyond psychiatric institutions and individual mental health crises. Which is ‘crazier’: a person talking to themselves and shouting in the middle of an intersection or an individual shouting, “More taxes! Less bread!”? Page 137

Nor is it merely a question of a simple parallelism, even though from the point of view of the failure of codes, such a parallelism is a much more precise formulation of the relationship between, for example, the phenomena of shifting of meaning in the case of schizophrenics and the mechanisms of ever increasing disharmony and discord at every level of industrial society. (AO, 34; emphasis mine) Page 137

if we were to draw a parallel between the two, they both share a similar process of destabilization or breakdown of codes (“failing of codes”). In schizophrenia, meaning is constantly shifting (whether it be words, social norms, etc.); it is as though “codes” of reality are falling apart for the schizophrenic. In capitalism, society experiences a breakdown where disharmony occurs at “every level of industrial society”; it is as though “codes” of labor, economic organization, and social relations are falling apart. Again, while schizophrenia and capitalism are not the same, they are both extremely similar in their relationship to decoding. Page 138

• [N] Capitalism's main tendency is decoding flows and deterritorializing the socius, constantly approaching a schizophrenic limit, but bound by the limit of capital.
• [N] Capitalism attempts to produce the "schizo subject" as the subject of decoded flows on the Body without Organs – a figure embodying both capitalist drive and revolutionary potential.
• [N] Schizophrenia is considered the characteristic "malady" of our era, not as individual madness but as a process of production inherent to capitalism's decoding of flows, leading to societal disharmony and breakdown of codes.

This section elaborates on capitalism's core process of decoding and deterritorializing flows, identifying it as the characteristic tendency that pushes towards a schizophrenic limit. Bound by the limit of capital, capitalism constantly approaches but cannot fully reach this limit. It attempts to produce the "schizo subject" as the ultimate expression of these decoded flows. Schizophrenia is framed here not just as a clinical condition but as a societal process inherent to capitalism's mode of production, reflecting a general breakdown and shifting of codes.

#on/capitalism #on/schizophrenia #on/decoding #on/deterritorialization

Capitalism's Counter-Tendency: Artificial Reterritorialization

Paragraph Twenty Page 138

What we are really trying to say is that capitalism, through its process of production, produces an awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge, against which it brings all its vast powers of repression to bear, but which nonetheless continues to act as capitalism’s limit. (AO, 34) Page 139

Capitalism’s process of production — through the three syntheses (the production of production, the production of distribution, and the production of consumption) — generates a “schizophrenic accumulation of energy” that decodes flows, breaking down established structures and limits. At the same time, capitalism exerts a repressive force on this very decoding, trying to establish a limit that, in a way, regulates these flows. As we’ve stated previously, capitalism is beheld to the limit of capital Page 139

For capitalism constantly counteracts, constantly inhibits this inherent tendency while at the same time allowing it free rein; it continually seeks to avoid reaching its limit while simultaneously tending toward that limit. (AO, 34) Page 139

capitalism both inhibits flows of desire while simultaneously allowing flows of desire free rein. Capitalism’s nature of decoding flows can never surpass the limit of capital, but rather, push this limit of capital further back. It is in this way that capitalism recodes flows in order to situate them in relation to capital: Page 139

Capitalism institutes or restores all sorts of residual and artificial, imaginary, or symbolic territorialities, thereby attempting, as best it can, to recode, to rechannel persons who have been defined in terms of abstract quantities. (AO, 34; emphasis mine) Page 139

The “imaginary” and “symbolic” territories discussed by Deleuze and Guattari refer to the institutions, practices, norms, and social structures that capitalism produces and sustains. Through the process of decoding by way of axiomatization, capitalism reduces the entire socius to abstract quantities, with individuals defined solely in terms of market value (moneycapital, “free worker”). As a result, capitalism must recode these flows of desire, often by constructing artificial identities that can only be fulfilled within the capitalist system. These territories are “imaginary” and “symbolic” in that they provide social coherence and identity, but only within the confines of capital. The same territories are repeated and continuously produced: Page 140

Everything returns or recurs: States, nations, families. (AO, 34) Page 140

[Decoding and recoding] is what makes the ideology of capitalism “a motley painting of everything that has ever been believed.” (AO, 34) Page 141

Indeed, you couldn’t wear a better mask, you people of today, than that of your own face! Who could recognize you! (Thus Spoke Zarathustra; On the Land of Education) Page 141

• [N] Nietzsche

Deleuze and Guattari argue that capitalism functions as a “motley painting of everything,” constantly shifting and morphing to adapt to any context, even co-opting movements that oppose it (such as the production of the book Das Kapital in sweatshops). This capacity allows capitalism to blend and absorb any ideology, creating a patchwork or motley of forms and identities that ensure its continued dominance. Through this process of decoding and recoding, capitalism continuously produces countless “imaginary” and “symbolic” territories, adapting them to sustain itself. However, despite these artificial territories and capitalism’s allencompassing nature, this does not entail that desire has failed to produce the real. Desire has been — and is always — engaged in the production of the real: Page 141

The real is not impossible; it is simply more and more artificial. (AO, 34) Page 142

No matter how artificial the real appears, it remains the real. The subject’s relentless consumption within capitalism — whether it’s a mansion promised to bring happiness, a luxury car, or a cutting-edge device to connect with others — often obscures the harsh reality embedded within this production process. In our pursuit of advertised dreams, we may fail to see the suffering and exploitation that make this consumption possible. (This reminds me of Jean Baudrillard’s hyperreality). However, none of this precludes the possibility of the real — the real is just continuously produced in an artificial manner. Page 142

Marx termed the twofold movement of the tendency to a falling rate of profit, and the increase in the absolute quantity of surplus value, the law of the counteracted tendency. (AO 34) Page 143

Marx’s law of the counteracted tendency, also known as the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, describes how the rate of profit in capitalist economies tends to decline over time. This happens because capitalists invest more in machinery (constant capital) relative to labor (variable capital). Earlier, we discussed Simondon’s concept of the technical machine. When a capitalist purchases a machine, it has a set market-value (constant capital) which is gradually transmitted to products that the machine produces. The reason the rate of profit falls as capitalists invest more in machinery is that profit comes from the exploitation of labor. Unlike machines, which have a fixed value, labor generates surplus value because workers are paid less than the value that they create. Essentially, workers produce more value than they are compensated for, and this difference is the profit for capitalists. Page 143

Let’s look at an example: A capitalist owns a factory that employs 100 workers. Does the capitalist like paying these 100 workers? Of course not! So, the capitalist buys a machine that can replace 50 of those workers, firing them in the process. However, even if the machine increases productivity by producing goods faster — it still has a fixed price. The machine can only transmit its value to the products it produces, but it cannot generate surplus value beyond its original cost. Now, the capitalist has one machine and 50 remaining workers, but here’s the problem: the machine itself cannot create more profit. Therefore, the capitalist has to counteract the fall of profit: to generate surplus value, the capitalist must exploit labor. Perhaps the capitalist fires another 25 workers and forces the remaining workers to work twice as hard. Or, the capitalist might extend their hours, eliminate bathroom and lunch breaks, or cut wages. Does the capitalist like paying these workers $10 an hour? Of course not! So, the capitalist might fire the remaining 25 workers and rehire new ones at $7.25 an hour, knowing that there are plenty of unemployed people (100 of them fired from this job alone) eager to take those jobs. Page 143

Deleuze and Guattari draw on Marx’s law of the counteracted tendency, arguing that decoding and recoding function within the same dual moment as the law of the counteracted tendency. Page 145

As a corollary of this law, there is the twofold movement of decoding or deterritorializing flows on the one hand, and their violent and artificial reterritorialization on the other. (AO, 34) Page 145

the twofold process of the capitalist machine deterritorializing flows and reterritorializing flows: Page 145

The more the capitalist machine deterritorializes, decoding and axiomatizing flows in order to extract surplus value from them, the more its ancillary apparatuses, such as government bureaucracies and the forces of law and order, do their utmost to reterritorialize, absorbing in the process a larger and larger share of surplus value. (AO, 34–35) Page 145

Deterritorializing flows persist in extracting surplus value, while the limit of capital is established through the reterritorialization of these flows in the likes of bureaucratic legal institutions of “law and order.” Page 146

• [N] Capitalism generates "schizophrenic accumulation of energy" (decoded flows) which acts as its limit, against which it applies repression.
• [N] Capitalism simultaneously inhibits and allows free rein to this deterritorializing tendency, tending towards its limit while trying to avoid reaching it completely.
• [N] Capitalism institutes artificial, imaginary, or symbolic territorialities (States, families, nations) to recode and rechannel individuals defined by abstract quantities. This constitutes capitalism's ideology as a "motley painting."
• [N] The production of the real under capitalism becomes increasingly artificial, yet still remains the real.
• [N] Drawing on Marx's law of the counteracted tendency (falling rate of profit countered by increased surplus value), Deleuze and Guattari see a twofold movement in capitalism: deterritorialization/decoding to extract surplus value, and violent, artificial reterritorialization by state apparatuses absorbing surplus value.

This section focuses on capitalism's inherent contradiction, mirroring Marx's law of the counteracted tendency. While capitalism's core tendency is to decode and deterritorialize flows, pushing towards a schizophrenic limit, it simultaneously counteracts this by installing artificial and symbolic territorialities (family, state, nation). This process of recoding attempts to contain the decoded flows and re-channel individuals defined by abstract quantities back into regulated structures, maintaining the limit of capital. This results in an increasingly artificial reality, but one that is still fundamentally real.

#on/capitalism #on/reterritorialization #on/marx #on/counteractedtendency #on/ideology

Neurosis, Perversion, and Schizophrenia in Relation to Capitalist Territorialities

Paragraph Twenty-One Page 146

There is no doubt that at this point in history the neurotic, the pervert, and the psychotic cannot be adequately defined in terms of drives, for drives are simply the desiring-machines themselves. (AO, 35) Page 146

According to Freud and Lacan, the neurotic, the pervert, and the psychotic are understood in terms of drives, which Deleuze and Guattari view as purely desiring-machines. However, interpreting these figures solely through the lens of desiring-machines overlooks the territories they inhabit. Page 146

They must be defined in terms of modern territorialities. (AO, 35) Page 147

The neurotic is trapped within the residual or artificial territorialities of our society, and reduces all of them (les rabat toutes) to Oedipus as the ultimate territoriality — as reconstructed in the analyst’s office and projected upon the full body of the psychoanalyst (yes, my boss is my father, and so is the Chief of State, and so are you, Doctor). (AO, 35) Page 147

The neurotic is ensnared by the artificial territorialities produced by society, reducing everything to Oedipus as the ultimate territoriality; they are projected onto the psychoanalyst’s entire being. In this way, the neurotic is confined to the roles society has imposed, with desire restricted, regulated, and channeled into these predefined structures. Page 147

The pervert is someone who takes the artifice seriously and plays the game to the hilt: if you want them, you can have them — territorialities infinitely more artificial than the ones that society offers us, totally artificial new families, secret lunar societies. (AO, 35) Page 147

Unlike the neurotic, who passively becomes trapped within these roles, the pervert actively engages with the game, deriving pleasure from pushing these artificial territories to their extreme. Page 147

• [N] Lacan

As for the schizo, continually wandering about, migrating here, there, and everywhere as best [the schizo] can, [the schizo] plunges further and further into the realm of deterritorialization, reaching the furthest limits of the decomposition of the socius on the surface of [their] own body without organs. (AO, 35) Page 148

Unlike the pervert, the schizo aims to completely reject and escape these artificial territorialities. The schizo roams the body without organs, striving to push beyond the limits imposed upon them and to create pure potentiality on their body without organs. The schizo is not bound to any single territory as they are constantly in a state of migration. Page 148

It may well be that these peregrinations are the schizo’s own particular way of rediscovering the earth. (AO, 35) Page 149

The schizophrenic deliberately seeks out the very limit of capitalism: [the schizophrenic] is its inherent tendency brought to fulfillment, its surplus product, its proletariat, and its exterminating angel. [The schizophrenic] scrambles all the codes and is the transmitter of the decoded flows of desire. The real continues to flow. (AO, 35) Page 149

the schizophrenic plays a crucial role in the perpetuation and production of capitalism. By decoding flows, the schizophrenic “seeks out the very limit of capitalism,” thereby pushing the boundaries of capital further. This means that we should be weary of a common misreading of Deleuze and Guattari’s work. Deleuze and Guattari are not implying that schizophrenia is liberatory or revolutionary here. Page 149

What must be noted here is that capitalism’s decoding of flows occurs through a schizophrenia as a process of production (with the transmitter of this decoding being the schizophrenic). Page 150

In the schizo, the two aspects of process are conjoined: the metaphysical process that puts us in contact with the “demoniacal” element in nature or within the heart of the earth, and the historical process of social production that restores the autonomy of desiring-machines in relation to the deterritorialized social machine. (AO, 35) Page 150

Both of these processes appear to be emblematic of desiring-production and social production whereby the difference lies in terms of régime. The first process is concerned with a metaphysical process, concerned with eradicating the dichotomy between human and the “demoniacal” element in nature. The second process is concerned with homo historia whereby desiring-machines have autonomy and are unleashed from being regulated and channeled in a particular manner dependent upon the socius in which they are constituted. Page 150

• [N] Neurosis, perversion, and psychosis are best understood in terms of how they relate to modern artificial territorialities, not just drives.
• [N] The neurotic is trapped by artificial territorialities, reducing them all to the Oedipal framework.
• [N] The pervert actively engages with and manipulates artificial territorialities, creating their own extreme versions.
• [N] The schizo plunges into deterritorialization, seeking to escape artificial territories and connect with the Body without Organs and the "demoniacal" in nature.
• [N] The schizophrenic embodies capitalism's deterritorializing tendency, acting as its limit, surplus product, and transmitter of decoded flows.
• [N] Schizophrenia combines a metaphysical process (connecting to nature/earth) with a historical process (restoring desiring-machine autonomy in the deterritorialized social machine).

This section differentiates the neurotic, pervert, and schizophrenic not by their drives but by their relationship to modern artificial territorialities. The neurotic is trapped within these, reducing them to the Oedipal. The pervert actively plays with and exaggerates them. The schizophrenic seeks radical deterritorialization, attempting to escape these structures and connect with the Body without Organs. The schizophrenic is presented as embodying capitalism's inherent deterritorializing tendency, constantly pushing its limit.

#on/neurosis #on/perversion #on/schizophrenia #on/territoriality

Schizophrenia as the Limit of Social Production

Schizophrenia is desiring-production as the limit of social production. (AO, 35; emphasis mine) Page 151

Does capitalism produce schizophrenia or does schizophrenia produce capitalism? But why stop with this question? Might capitalism and schizophrenia be interdependently related? ... Or, more precisely, is schizophrenia just the limit of any social production, to which capitalism has a unique relationship with because of its tendency towards this limit? Page 151

Desiring-production, and its difference in regime as compared to social production, are thus end points, not points of departure. (AO, 35; emphasis mine) Page 152

the difference in régime between desiringproduction and social production cannot be understood by viewing them as separate starting points. Instead, it is at an “end point” that the distinction between the two becomes clear. Only when capitalism nears its ultimate limit — when it begins “breaking down” under its own contradictions — can we clearly distinguish between capitalism and schizophrenia. This is because only schizophrenia is capable of pushing the limit of capital further. Schizophrenia is a decoding and deterritorialization of the flows of desire that serves as a process of capitalism; however, these flows inevitably become contained through capitalism’s recording and reterritorialization which serves to maintain the limit of capital. Therefore, the distinction between these two forms of production is found at an endpoint. Page 152

capitalism and schizophrenia are interdependent, with one producing the other; and this produces reality: Page 152

Between the two there is nothing but an ongoing process of becoming that is the becoming of reality. (AO, 35) Page 152

And if materialist psychiatry may be defined as the psychiatry that introduces the concept of production into consideration of the problem of desire, it cannot avoid posing in eschatological terms the problem of the ultimate relationship between the analytic machine, the revolutionary machine, and desiring-machines. (AO, 35) Page 153

• [N] Schizophrenia is defined as desiring-production at the limit of social production.
• [N] The relationship between desiring-production and social production, including their difference in régime, is best understood not from their origins but from their "end points" or limits, particularly as capitalism approaches its schizophrenic limit.
• [N] Capitalism and schizophrenia are interdependent, mutually producing reality through their ongoing process of becoming.
• [N] Materialist psychiatry, by introducing production into the problem of desire, must consider the eschatological relationship between the analytic machine, the revolutionary machine, and desiring-machines.

This concluding section posits schizophrenia as desiring-production specifically at the limit of social production. The distinction between desiring-production and social production, despite their fundamental unity, becomes clearest at their "end points" or limits. Capitalism's inherent tendency towards its schizophrenic limit highlights this relationship. The ongoing process of becoming between desiring-production and social production constitutes the becoming of reality itself. Materialist psychiatry, focused on production, must ultimately confront the relationship between different "machines" (analytic, revolutionary, desiring) in terms of ultimate transformation.

#on/schizophrenia #on/limit #on/capitalism #on/materialistpsychiatry #on/becoming

Quick Recap

Capitalism decodes flows of desire, constantly creating new possibilities to increase productivity and generate surplus value. This makes capitalism a highly creative and innovative system, continually pushing the limit of capital forward to sustain itself. However, if capitalism were to allow these decoded flows of desire — this schizophrenia — to have free rein, it would collapse, as capitalism needs boundaries to maintain its structure. To prevent this, capitalism must recode these flows, channeling desire back into socially productive forms (like the family, the state, and various artificial identities), thereby maintaining the limits of capital and ensuring its continued reproduction. Page 154

capitalism produces the schizophrenic subject because it requires schizophrenia as a way to resolve its own contradictions. Capitalism requires a creative force to continually generate surplus value amid its inherent contradictions. However, if left unchecked, the schizophrenic subject would no longer feel the need to conform to the artificial territory of capital — they would no longer adhere to the societal structures that sustain the system. Therefore, capitalism must recode these flows of desire, producing artificial identities that promote endless consumption within capitalism. These artificial identities, however, are simultaneously decoded by the schizo, who constantly pushes against the boundaries and constraints that capitalism seeks to enforces. This process of decoding and recoding happens in one fell swoop, akin to Marx’s law of counteracted tendency; allowing the system to move forward amidst its contradictions. Page 154

The implication of capitalism necessitating decoding and recoding means something very important: contradiction is built into the system. Page 154

• [N] Capitalism decodes desire flows, creating possibilities and surplus value, pushing the limit of capital.
• [N] Capitalism must recode these flows into artificial territorialities (family, state, etc.) to prevent collapse and maintain its structure.
• [N] Capitalism produces the schizophrenic subject as a figure that both generates capital (via decoding/deterritorialization) and pushes against capital's limits, embodying the system's inherent contradiction (decoding vs. recoding).
• [N] This decoding/recoding mirrors Marx's law of the counteracted tendency and highlights contradiction built into capitalism.

This recap summarizes the key point that capitalism's process of decoding desire flows (schizophrenic tendency) generates energy and surplus value but must be counteracted by artificial recoding into established social forms to prevent collapse and maintain the limit of capital. Capitalism produces the schizophrenic subject, who embodies both its deterritorializing drive and its counter-tendency, revealing the system's inherent contradiction. This constant decoding and recoding allows capitalism to perpetuate itself.

#on/capitalism #on/decoding #on/recoding #on/schizophrenia #on/contradiction